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Abstract: This article examines the relationships between different ethical attitudes toward 
environmental quality and the ‘use’ values obtained from the environment. In particular, we 
consider individuals who have duty-based ethical attitudes that lead to lexicographic preferences 
for environmental quality. We show that individuals with duty-based ethical attitudes have 
recreation demand functions that are ‘kinked,’ exhibiting perfectly inelastic behavior over some 
range of income. However, the kinks cannot be identified from typical cross-sectional data, and 
to the extent that observed recreation demand for these individuals differs from those with 
neoclassical preferences, such differences could be captured empirically through a proxy variable 
that measures ethical attitudes. A more fundamental issue is that changes in welfare for duty-
based individuals cannot be determined from their estimated demand function: while an 
exogenous rise in environmental quality is likely to increase their demand for recreation by these 
individuals, additional recreation is not the reason for an improvement in well-being. An 
empirical model to identify the effect of ethical attitudes on recreation is illustrated using survey 
data on stated preferences for visits to urban parks.   
 
Keywords: Environmental Ethics, Protest Bids, Use Values, Lexicographic Preferences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  2
1. Introduction 
During the past few decades, economists have developed several methods for estimating 
the non-market value of environmental goods, but obtaining reliable and robust estimates has 
proved to be a challenging task. This challenge has lead to a large literature on refinements in 
valuation techniques (e.g., Braden and Kolstad, 1991). At the same time, a small but growing 
literature has considered a more fundamental issue, centering on the following questions: “Do 
survey respondents consider the tradeoffs between changes in income and environmental quality 
or do they only consider the latter? Does the notion of indifference fit into their choices?” 
(Edwards, 1986, p. 149). The answers to these questions quite possibly explain many of the 
‘anomalous’ results in nonmarket valuation studies, such as protest bids and the large disparity 
between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept values (Blamey and Common, 1999).  
The basic insight in this literature is that some ethical attitudes give rise to lexicographic 
preferences, implying no possibility of tradeoffs between income and environmental preservation 
(Edwards, 1986; Spash, 2000). For example, someone who regards biodiversity protection as a 
moral duty cannot be compensated for the extinction of a species. Because lexicographic 
preferences cannot be represented by a utility function (Deaton and Muelbauer, 1993), such 
individuals lie outside the utilitarian framework on which nonmarket valuation is based.  
Economists have generally dismissed lexicographic preferences as being an unrealistic 
special case because of their no-tradeoff property (Spash, 2000). Yet, a growing body of survey 
evidence suggests they are responsible for the ‘nonuse’ values that many people ascribe to 
various aspects of the environment. Several researchers have followed the suggestion of Edwards 
(1992), that empirical studies of nonuse values should be expanded to determine the motives that 
underlie survey responses. This expanded method has been applied primarily to the nonuse 
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values of biodiversity protection (Stevens et al., 1991; Spash and Hanley, 1995; Blamey and 
Common, 1995; Common et al., 1997; Spash, 2000). All these studies found that nonuse values 
of biodiversity were formed by lexicographic preferences for a significant number of individuals. 
In this article, we examine the relationships between different ethical attitudes toward 
environmental preservation and the ‘use’ values obtained from the environment. While previous 
research has established the link between ethical views and nonuse values, such views may also 
impact the demand for recreation activities that generate use values. In particular, we assume that 
all individuals have utilitarian preferences regarding recreation and other market goods, in the 
sense that tradeoffs between them are continuous and demands adjust to price changes. However, 
some individuals have duty-based ethical attitudes toward environmental preservation, and are 
unwilling to trade off environmental quality for changes in income, provided that income is 
above some threshold level (Edwards, 1986). For these individuals, a rise in environmental 
quality is likely to increase the demand for recreation, but additional recreation is not the reason 
for an improvement in their well-being. 
Individuals with duty-based ethical attitudes are shown to have a recreation demand 
function that is ‘kinked,’ exhibiting perfectly inelastic behavior over some range of income. 
However, the kinks cannot be identified from cross-sectional data, so that observed recreation 
demands have the same general properties as their utilitarian counterparts. Thus, to the extent 
that duty-based and utilitarian demand functions would differ empirically, they could be captured 
through a proxy variable that measures ethical attitudes. Such an approach extends Edward’s 
(1992) recommendation for including ethical motives into the realm of use values. 
Before introducing theoretical and empirical models with different ethical attitudes 
affecting use values, we review the literature on the relationship between ethical attitudes and 
  4
individual preferences in section 2. Section 3 then presents a model of recreation demand for 
individuals with utilitarian and duty-based ethics toward the environment. In section 4, this 
model is applied to estimate demand functions for recreation at urban parks for populations with 
different ethical views. Section 5 concludes and summarizes our findings.  
2. Ethical Attitudes and Individual Preferences 
The starting point for microeconomic analysis is the concept of a preference ordering, or 
a rule that ranks any two states of the world based on their relative desirability to an individual. 
These individual preferences must be under-girded by a set of value judgments or ethical 
attitudes. Environmental philosophers have discussed various types of these attitudes and their 
implication for the structure of preferences (e.g.,  Des Jardins, 1997; Glasser, 1999).  
Figure 1 simplistically categorizes ethical attitudes along two dimensions: (1) how an 
individual reasons, and (2) who or what is taken into account in one’s reasoning. The first 
dimension can take one of two basic forms: consequentialism and deontology (Glasser, 1999). A 
consequentialist considers only the consequences of an action to be important and ignores the 
process of achieving the goal. In contrast, a deontologist believes that decisions must be based on 
moral principles and that the process of achieving some goal can be judged ‘wrong’ if a principle 
is violated. The second dimension is a continuum, ranging from attitudes that consider only the 
decision-maker (egoism) to those that consider the entire ecosystem (ecocentrism). The figure 
divides these possibilities into two categories, humanism and naturalism. Attitudes in the 
humanist category limit moral consideration to human beings; non-human entities are given only 
instrumental value in improving human welfare. Naturalist attitudes are those that give 
independent moral standing to all or a part of nature.  
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The Neoclassical Paradigm 
 Neoclassical economics relies primarily on utilitarianism, an ethical attitude that is both 
consequentialist and humanist. An individual is seen as striving to improve well being as 
measured by a utility function, which depends on ‘market’ goods that are purchased by the 
individual as well as ‘nonmarket’ goods beyond his or her direct control (e.g., the preservation of 
wildlife species). Concerns about the environment are thus captured as nonmarket goods that 
affect individual utility. Formally, if an individual’s preferences over a set of k goods are 
complete, reflexive, transitive, continuous, and strongly monotonic, then they can be represented 
by an ordinal utility function : ku  R R . Suppose there are k – 1 market goods, denoted x1, ..., 
xk-1 and one nonmarket good, q. The individual’s indirect utility function is then defined as 
 MxpqxuqMpv
x
 :),(max),,( , where M is money income and p is the vector of prices of 
the market goods. The utility-maximizing level of the ith market good is the demand function for 
that good, denoted, xi(p, M, q). 
From the individual’s point of view, the level of the nonmarket good is exogenous. The 
purpose of nonmarket valuation methods is to find the implicit price or the willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) for such a good. In particular, suppose the individual is confronted with a proposal that 
would increase the level of the nonmarket good from q to q. The WTP for this change is 
implicitly defined by the equation ),,(),WTP,( qMpvqMpv  . In the contingent valuation 
method, WTP is elicited through hypothetical survey questions. The most common criticism of 
the contingent valuation method is that hypothetical responses may not reflect true values (e.g., 
Hausman, 1993), and that survey respondents will find a WTP question difficult to answer 
because they are not accustomed to placing monetary values on nonmarket goods (Harper, 1989; 
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Opaluch and Segerson, 1989). A more fundamental problem arises if respondents’ ethical 
attitudes differ from the framework upon which valuation methods are based (Edwards, 1986).  
Ethical Attitudes and Lexicographic Preferences 
As mentioned above, recent survey evidence suggests that many people adhere to 
naturalistic and deontological ethical attitudes for environmental policy decisions, and that these 
attitudes drive the nonuse values for biodiversity. In the context of the model above, such 
individuals have lexicographic preferences for q, which imply that continuous indifference 
curves between M and q do not exist. Thus, the preferences of these individuals cannot be 
represented by a utility function because the continuity condition is violated (Deaton and 
Muelbauer, 1993, p. 27).  
Lexicographic and utilitarian preferences are compared in Figure 2 based on the model in 
Edwards (1986). The vertical axis of each diagram measures income (M), and the horizontal axis 
is some environmental good such as wildlife (q). The left panel depicts the indifference curves 
for utilitarian preferences (i.e., the level sets of v(p, M, q) where p is fixed). Such an individual is 
indifferent between Y and Z and would prefer either of these points to X. The right panel shows 
‘bounded’ lexicographic preferences, where M* identifies the income level above which the 
environmental good is of higher priority than income.1 M* can be thought of as the income 
needed for some minimum standard of living. Above M*, more environmental protection is 
always preferred to less, regardless of the consequences to money income. Since the individual 
always desires the environmental good, no trade-off exists between q and income above M* in 
this region. Among the three points shown, Y is preferred to both X and Z because Y corresponds 
                                                 
1 These preferences were first applied in an environmental valuation context by Edwards (1986), although they were 
discussed more generally by Georgescu-Roegen (1954). 
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to a higher level of environmental quality, while the decision maker would be indifferent 
between Z and X even though Z corresponds to a higher income level.  
The existence of non-utilitarian preferences has both positive and normative implications 
for nonmarket valuation research (Blamey and Common, 1999). The positive implication is that 
such preferences explain many of the observed responses to contingent valuation surveys, 
particularly those that are viewed as ‘anomalous’ from the utilitarian perspective. Edwards 
(1986) noted that WTP is well defined in the region above M* but may be very large, since the 
individual would be willing to pay the amount M – M* for any improvement in q. On the other 
hand, willingness-to-accept (WTA) for a reduction in q is infinite—no amount of income could 
compensate the individual for a loss in the environmental good. The model therefore predicts 
that lexicographic individuals may not be willing to place a dollar amount on an environmental 
good, and will give ‘protest’ responses to a valuation question by reporting an inordinately large 
amount or else refusing to answer.2  
The normative implication involves the interpretation of existence values as measured by 
WTP. Although WTP is well defined for lexicographic preferences, it does not measure a 
compensating welfare change as in the utilitarian model (Edwards, 1986). In the region above 
M* in figure 2(b), q > q is always preferred to q regardless of the associated income levels. This 
implies that Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation is impossible for these individuals, violating 
the fundamental assumption of benefit-cost analysis. Thus, aggregate WTP cannot be interpreted 
in the usual way as the benefits of preservation.  
                                                 
2 Spash (2000) found that many modest-sized bids for wetland restoration were motivated by lexicographic 
preferences, perhaps because M* was close to the respondent’s actual income. His alternative explanation was that 
the respondent felt that only a modest payment was needed to protect the resource; a larger payment would be 
offered if the resource became highly endangered. 
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As noted, the economics profession has generally dismissed lexicographic preferences 
due to their unusual no trade-off property (Spash, 2000). However, emerging research has clearly 
indicated that certain economic agents are unwilling to trade off income for environmental 
quality due to their ethical stance (Stevens et al., 1991; Spash and Hanley, 1995; Blamey and 
Common, 1995; Common et al., 1997; Spash, 2000).  Such preferences are one explanation for 
the protest bids and other ‘anomalous’ results in nonmarket valuation studies. 
3.  A Model of Recreation Demand with Bounded Lexicographic Preferences 
This section develops a model to describe the demand for recreation under both utilitarian 
and lexicographic preferences for environmental quality. Let u(x, r, q; a) represent the utility 
function of individuals with utilitarian preferences, where x is a vector of market commodities, r 
is the number of visits to some recreation site, q represents environmental quality, and a is a 
vector of personal attributes that may affect preferences (e.g., age, gender). Welfare comparisons 
for such an individual can be obtained from the indirect utility function v(p, t, M, q; a) 
=  
,
max ( , , ; ) :
x r
u x r q a p x tr M   , where t is the travel cost to the recreation site. The solutions 
to the maximization problem are the demand functions for market commodities and recreation. 
Thus, the number of recreation visits by utilitarian individual is a function of the general form 
(1) ru(p, t, M, q, a).  
Preferences are often assumed to be such that recreation demand is decreasing in travel costs, 
increasing in income (i.e., recreation is a ‘normal’ good), and increasing in environmental 
quality: ru/t < 0, ru/M  0 and ru/q > 0, respectively.  
Now consider deontological individuals with bounded lexicographic preferences for q. 
Each deontologist has a threshold income level M* above which there is no tradeoff between M 
and q (figure 2). Since well-being can only be improved by increasing q if income is greater than 
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M*, a deontologist will rationally devote all income beyond M* to improving environmental 
quality. Thus, a budget of at most M* is devoted to x and r. Let M~  represent the income 
allocated to market goods, defined as *],min[~ MMM  . Assuming these individuals have 
continuous preferences for commodities and recreation, the demands for these items can be 
obtained as the solutions to:  
,
max ( , ; , ) :
x r
f x r q a p x tr M    , where f() is a continuous function 
that represents the tradeoffs between x and r. Here, q enters f() purely as a parameter that affects 
the shape of the indifference map for x and r, since an increase in environmental quality may 
affect the way allocable income is budgeted. 
The deontological individual’s demand for recreation is ),,~,,( aqMtprd . This function is 
kinked in income space, since  
(2) 







*
*
 if0
 if~
)(
MM
MM
M
r
dM
dr dd  
Figure 3 depicts the kinked Engel curves (i.e., the demand functions in r-M space) for two 
deontological individuals with income thresholds of *1M  and 
*
2M , respectively. As implied by 
equation (2), both demands are perfectly inelastic with respect income to above the thresholds. 
Therefore, a testable hypothesis derived from this model is that individual demand functions for 
deontologists have a zero income elasticity above some income level. 
 However, this hypothesis cannot be tested directly with typical cross-sectional data. Since 
the threshold values are unobservable, the kinks cannot be identified from a dataset with one 
observation for each individual. Points z1 and z2 in figure 3 represent the observations in this type 
of dataset. The dashed line represents the observed demand relationship for deontologists, which 
is a smooth function of M that can be written in the general form 
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(3) rd(p, t, M, q, a). 
Although this function is made up of points on individual demand functions that have income-
inelastic regions, rd() itself may be more or less income elastic than its utilitarian counterpart 
ru() in equation (1). For pure cross-sectional datasets, the theory predicts that the recreation 
demand relationship will differ across groups of individuals with distinct ethical attitudes, but the 
quantitative nature of the differences is an empirical issue.  
4.  An Empirical Illustration: The Demand for Recreation at Urban Parks 
 To illustrate the link between ethical attitudes and recreation, we empirically apply the 
model from section 3 to the demand for urban parks. Like many other urban areas, the city of 
Topeka, Kansas has recently experimented with the use of “green technologies” to manage 
storm-water runoff, which typically take the form of higher tree densities or constructed wetlands 
in public spaces. Aside from their use in water management, green technologies may also 
provide public benefits in the form of improved natural amenities for park visitors. To gather 
initial estimates of these amenity values, the Topeka Public Works Department conducted a 
survey that elicited likely visitation rates to parks enhanced by green technologies, ethical and 
environmental attitudes, and other demographic data. These data thus provide an ideal testing 
ground to illustrate our model. 
The Data 
Data were gathered from the survey mailed to municipal water patrons in Topeka. 
Summary statistics of the survey responses used here are in table 1; the complete survey 
instrument can be found in Gelso (2002). The survey elicited three groups of variables. First, 
households were asked about their attitudes toward water quality in Topeka and environmental 
policy in general. In this section of the survey, respondents were asked whether they participate 
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in various local recreation activities. The responses to this question are represented by the 
variable REC, the ratio of the number activities indicated to the number of possibilities listed 
(nine). Respondents were next asked to rate the importance of various environmental issues on a 
Likert scale (where 1 is “not important” and 5 is “very important”); these responses were 
averaged to create the index variable ENVIR. The respondent’s ethical attitude was then elicited 
by asking the following question: 
 How should we think about environmental policy? Check one box only. 
 Decisions about the environment should be based on moral duty (“right versus wrong”). 
 Only the consequences of environmental policy are important (“benefits versus costs”). 
 
The response to this question is the indicator variable DEON, which equals 1 if the first response 
was chosen (deontology) and zero for the second response (consequentialism). 
 The second section of the survey elicited the visitation to hypothetical parks with a high 
tree density and a constructed wetland. Visitation rates at different ‘prices’ were elicited via an 
indirect hypothetical method, whereby survey respondents indicate their desired number of visits 
to hypothetical parks at different distances from their home. The primary benefit of the method is 
that it aligns with households’ pricing experience for the good in question; respondents are 
accustomed to making travel decisions for public parks but are not accustomed to paying explicit 
entrance fees. The survey displayed photographs of each type of park, and asked the likely 
number of visits to each if it were a given distance from the respondent’s home and the only park 
in their area. The variables TREEPARK and WETPARK are the number of visits to each type of 
park and PRICE is the imputed travel cost based on distance. The third and final section of the 
survey elicited demographic attributes, which are reported in the lower portion of table 1. 
The survey instrument was mailed with the August 2001 water bill to 50,000 households 
in Topeka and 2,551 usable surveys were returned. This implies a disappointingly low response 
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rate, which probably resulted from distributing the survey with the water bill. The likely presence  
of non-response bias limits our ability to generalize the results to the general population of 
Topeka. 
As Dalecki et al. (1993) noted, sample non-response bias is likely to occur very 
frequently with mail surveys.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to test or correct for because by 
definition the data on the non-respondents are unavailable. Perhaps the most common feasible 
approach is to compare early and late survey responses, based on the assumption that the time of 
response is a proxy for the likelihood of responding at all. Another approach is to weight the 
observations in the observed sample by the ratio of over- or under-sampling of the overall 
population based on one or more characteristics (Dalecki et al. 1993). Because our data did not 
include the date at which surveys were returned and we do not have population data on the 
characteristics collected in the survey (such as environmental attitudes), we were not able to test 
or correct for the non-response bias with these methods. Nevertheless, the sample is quite large 
with considerable variation in most characteristics, allowing us to explore the impact of ethical 
attitudes for the individuals in the sample, even though the population they represent may not 
correspond to the general population of Topeka.   
Estimation 
 In order to test whether ethical attitudes affect the demand for park visitation, a pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model was used to estimate demand coefficients for 
two groups of respondents. We used the Box-Cox method to evaluate alternative functional 
forms for the demand functions. This method transforms the dependent variable, independent 
variables, or both, to identify the appropriate nonlinear transformation. Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
(1991, pp. 240-243) define the Box-Cox model as:  
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(4) 
21
0
1 2
11 i
i
i
xy              
where y is the dependent variable, xi is the ith independent variable, the ’s are regression 
parameters,  is a stochastic error term, and the ’s are Box-Cox parameters. If 1 = 2 = 1, 
equation (4) is equivalent to the linear form 01 ( 1)i iiy x        . If 1 = 2 = 0, then (in 
the limit) equation (4) becomes the double log form   i ii xy lnln 0 . A third 
possibility is 1 = 0 and 2 = 1, where (4) is equivalent to the semi-exponential form 
0ln i iiy x      . Various models were fit with alternative values of 1 and 2, and the 
results were compared based on overall goodness-of-fit. These comparisons suggested the most 
appropriate of the three models for our demand equations was the semi-exponential form.  
 The estimated equations were: 
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where 1 and 2 are mean-zero error terms, and the variables DSEX, DAGE, DURBAN, 
DCHILD, DEDU, DREC, and DENVIR are slope dummy terms that represent interactions 
between each variable and DEON (e.g., DSEX = SEXDEON). All other variables are defined 
in table 1. The slope dummy terms allow the shapes of the demand functions to differ between 
consequentialist and deontological survey respondents.   
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 PRICE and ENVIR are expected to have negative and positive effects on park visitation, 
respectively, but the directions of impact for other variables are unknown a priori. The impact of 
REC, for instance, depends on whether other recreation activities are substitutes or complements 
for park visitation. The signs and magnitudes of DEON and the slope dummy terms are also an 
empirical question; they simultaneously equal zero under the null hypothesis that ethical attitudes 
have no effect on visitation demand. 
Results 
Estimation results are provided in Table 2. As may be expected from cross sectional data, 
the relatively low adjusted R-squares imply that park visitation depends on a number of random 
factors in addition to those represented as regressors. As expected, the number of visits declines 
as travel costs (PRICE) increase and rises with heightened sensitivity to environmental issues 
(ENVIR). The positive sign on REC in both equations implies that park visits and other 
recreation activities are complements. Female respondents visit parks more frequently than 
males, and park visitation decreases with age but increases with education and income.   
The null hypothesis that ethical attitudes have no effect on park visitation is rejected at 
the 99% level of confidence in both the TREEPARK and WETPARK equations.3 DEON and 
several of the slope-shift variables are statistically different from zero at the 95% level, implying 
that ethical attitudes affected both the location and shape of park visitation demand. The dummy 
variable DEON affects demand more strongly (both in terms of magnitude and statistical 
significance) than the other measures of environmental attitudes REC and ENVIR. Thus, 
accounting for personal ethics not only improved the statistical performance of the model, but 
also captured ‘personal motivation’ factors better than general questions about environmental 
                                                 
3 The F-statistics for TREEPARK and WETPARK were 7.29 and 6.70, respectively, while the corresponding critical 
value for a 99% level of confidence was 2.32. 
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stewardship. Another important implication is that omitting ethical characteristics would lead to 
biased and inconsistent estimates of other model parameters. 
To further aid in interpreting the results, table 3 reports the response elasticities of all 
variables for the two groups of stated ethical attitudes (DEON = 0 and DEON = 1). Among the 
respondents where DEON = 1 (hereafter, “deontologists”), the elasticities for SEX are nearly 
zero in both equations, implying that the difference in visitation patterns among males and 
females is less prevalent for deontologists (table 3). Park visitation by deontologists is less 
sensitive to age and the number of children than visitation by consequentialists, but these effects 
are not statistically significant in the TREEPARK equation. Deontologists’ visitation is more 
sensitive to income and price changes, although the difference is not statistically significant in 
the WETPARK equation.  
Although larger (absolute) elasticities for deontologists may seem a counter-intuitive 
result, it is important to recall that these elasticities do not reflect the shape of individual demand 
functions. As illustrated in figure 3, the estimated relationship is the envelope of cross-sectional 
observations, each of which represents a point on a deontological individual’s demand surface. 
Even if all observations are located on perfectly inelastic regions of individual demand curves, 
the estimated relationship in general will have a positive elasticity, and based on our sample, the 
elasticities for deontologists were generally larger than those for consequentialists.   
In general, deontologists and consequentialists have aggregate demand functions with the 
same qualitative properties. With the exception of SEX in the WETPARK equation, all 
statistically significant variables affect demand in the same direction for both types of 
respondents (table 3). However, the significant quantitative differences in the demand functions 
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are important. A model that combines the data from all households will generate misleading 
predictions of park visitation and welfare effects from amenity improvements. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 This paper has investigated the impact of ethical dichotomies on the demand for public 
environmental services. Stated ethical views were found to be an empirically significant 
determinant of the visitation demand to urban parks for a sample of Topeka survey respondents. 
While the consequentialist follows the traditional benefit-versus cost framework, the 
deontologist is concerned with a sequential ordering of goals according to right-versus-wrong.  
Our findings are consistent with recent literature that has also found evidence of lexicographic 
orderings for the nonuse aspect of environmental goods.  
 Interesting implications can be seen from a model that accounts for ethical attitudes that 
lead to lexicographic preferences. Aside from explaining the anomalous responses in 
applications of contingent valuation, previous literature has established that lexicographic 
preferences for nonuse values invalidate the method of benefit-cost analysis. The results here 
suggest that diversity in ethical motivations lead to a similar set of problems when estimating 
environmental use values. People with different ethical views have distinct use values for urban 
parks, and accurate depictions of the use value relationships cannot be found unless ethical 
motivations are explicitly captured in the empirical model. For certain groups of individuals, the 
recreation demand curve cannot be used to infer the welfare effects from changes in 
environmental quality. Further research is needed to determine the significance of environmental 
attitudes on other types of use values.  
 Individuals with duty-based ethical attitudes were also shown in this research to have a 
recreation demand function that is ‘kinked,’ exhibiting perfectly inelastic behavior over some 
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range of income. However, the kinks cannot be identified from cross-sectional data with one 
observation per household. Developing data collection procedures and empirical methods to 
estimate household-level demands in this situation is an issue that warrants further research.  
 
Acknowledgements 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those 
of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The authors wish to thank the staff of the Public 
Works Department in the City of Topeka for their assistance in distributing the mail survey. 
Helpful comments by an anonymous Ecological Economcis reviewer are also gratefully 
acknowledged. This research was supported in part by funds provided by the USDA National 
Agroforestry Center, part of the Rocky Mountain Research Station, Forest Service, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture.   
 
References 
Blamey, R., Common, M., 1995.  Respondents to contingent valuation surveys: Citizens or 
consumers?” Australian J. of Agric. Econ., 39: 263-88. 
Blamey, R.K., Common, M.S., 1999.  Valuation and ethics in environmental economics. In J. 
van den Bergh, (Editors), Handbook of Ethics and Environmental Policy, Northampton, 
MA, Edward Elgar, pp. 809-823. 
Braden, J.B., Kolstad, C.D. (Editors), 1991.  Measuring the Demand for Environmental Quality. 
Elsevier Science, New York. 
Common, M., Reid, I., Blamey, R., 1997.  Do existence values for cost benefit analysis exist?  
Envir. Res. Econ. 9: 225-38. 
  18
Dalecki, M., Whitehead, J. C., Blomquist, G. C., 1993.  Sample non-response bias  
and aggregate benefits in contingent valuation: An examination of early, late,  
 and non-respondents. J. Envir. Manag., 38: 133-43. 
Deaton, A., Muellbauer, J., 1993.  Economics of consumer behavior. New York, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 27. 
Des Jardins, J., 1997.  Environmental ethics: An introduction to environmental philosophy. 
Wadsworth, Belmont, CA. 
Edwards, S.F., 1986. Ethical perspectives and the assessment of existence values: Does the 
neoclassical model fit?  Northeast. J. of Agric. Res. Econ., 15: 145-59. 
Edwards, S.F., 1992.  Rethinking existence values.  Land Econ. 68: 120-22. 
Fugitt, D., Wilcox, S., 1999.  Cost-benefit analysis for public sector decision makers. Quorium 
Books, London. 
Gelso, B.R., 2002.  Combining revealed and stated preference data to estimate the non-market 
value of green technologies. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. Kansas State University, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Manhattan, KS.  
Georgescu-Roegen, N., 1954.  Choice expectations and measurability.  Q. J. of Econ. 68: 503-
534. 
Glasser, H., 1999.  Ethical perspectives and environmental policy analysis. In van den Bergh, J. 
(Editor), Handbook of Ethics and Environmental Policy, Edward Elgar, Northampton, 
MA, pp. 981-1000. 
Harper, C.R., 1989.  Rational roots of irrational behavior: Discussion.  Northeast. J. of Agric. 
Res. Econ. 18: 96-97 
  19
Hausman, J.A., (Editor), 1993.  Contingent Valuation:  A Critical Assessment. Elsevier Science, 
New York, NY. 
Opaluch, J.J., Segerson, K., 1989. Rational roots of irrational behavior:  New theories of 
economic decision-making.  Northeast. J. of Agric. Res. Econ. 18: 81-95. 
Pindyck, R., Rubinfeld, D., 1991. Econometric Models and Dconomic Forecasts. McGraw-Hill, 
New York, NY. 
Spash, C.L., Hanley, N.D., 1995.  Preference information and biodiversity preservation. Ecol. 
Econ. 12: 191-208. 
Spash, C.L., 2000.  Ecosystems, contingent valuation and ethics: The case of wetland recreation, 
Ecol. Econ. 24:195-215. 
Stevens, T.H., Echeverria, J., Glass, R.J., Hager, T., More, T.A., 1991.  Measuring the existence 
value of wildlife: What do CVM estimates really show?” Land Econ.  67: 390-400. 
  20
Table 1. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Definition      Meana  min  max  
Environmental Attitudes: 
 
REC  level of participation in local recreation activities (proportion)  0.28        0  1 
         (0.22) 
 
ENVIR      importance of environmental issues (Likert scale)   4.39         1       5 
         (16.8) 
 
DEON        indicator for ethical attitude (1=deontology, 0=consequentialism)  0.77       0        1 
         (0.42) 
      
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                  
Park Visitation:  
 
TREEPARK       number of visits (per year)  to park with high tree density   14.9      0      100 
         (21.6) 
 
WETPARK        number of visits (per year) to park with wetland   8.76        0      100 
         (16.8) 
 
PRICE        cost of travel plus opportunity cost of time ($/visit)b   10.96                  0       29.87  
5.71) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------                  
Exogenous Variables:  
 
EDU  years of education      15.6  10 20 
         (2.85)    
      
INC  income ($/year)      53339  15000 150000 
         (33279)  
 
SEX  gender (1=male)      0.45  0 1 
         (0.49) 
 
AGE  respondent’s age in years     53.25  18 98 
        (16.7) 
         
URBAN  type of neighborhood (1=urban, 0=rural)    0.90  0 1 
         (0.29) 
           
CHILD  number of children in household     0.55  0 9 
            (1.00)  
 
a  Number in parentheses  are standard deviations.  
b Opportunity cost of leisure time was calculated 1/3 of the individual’s wage rate (Fugitt and Wilcox, 1999). 
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Table 2.  Estimated Park Visitation Demand Equations 
 
TREEPARK Equation 
 
WETPARK Equation 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
INTERCEPT -0.2572*** 0.1180  -0.2572** 0.1399 
DEON 0.3256*** 0.1368  0.2635*         0.1617        
SEX -0.1288*** 0.0256  -0.1176*** 0.0301       
AGE -0.0024*** 0.0008        -0.0027*** 0.0042 
URBAN 0.0623 0.0414  0.000994 0.0492 
CHILD 0.0137         0.0130  -0.0212 0.0153      
EDU 0.00248 0.00429  0.00114 0.00513 
INC 0.0000039*** 0.00000137  0.00000165 0.00000165 
REC 0.4443***         0.06032         0.6099*** 0.0720 
ENVIR 0.1482*** 0.0169        0.2297*** 0.0203      
PRICE -0.0256***         0.0081  0.0090 0.0098 
DSEX 0.1218*** 0.0288  0.1439***         0.0343 
DAGE -0.000923     0.00095  -0.0005493 0.00112 
DURBAN -0.0855**         0.0462        -0.0074         0.05473 
DCHILD -0.0104         0.0049        0.0242         0.01733        
DEDU 0.0093**         0.0049  0.01108** 0.0059 
DINC 0.00000539*** 0.00000155  0.00000451*** 0.00000186 
DREC -0.1425** 0.0673  -0.2405*** 0.08006 
DENVIR -0.0711***         0.0202        -0.0754***         0.02401 
DPRICE -0.0303*** 0.0091  -0.02834***         0.01094 
Adjusted R2 0.1798   0.1830  
Observations 4116   3958  
(*) Statistically different from zero at the 90%  level of confidence.  
(**) Statistically different from zero at the 95%  level of confidence.  
(***) Statistically different from zero at the 99% level of confidence. 
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Table 3.  Elasticities at the Data Means 
 
TREEPARK Equation 
 
WETPARK Equation 
Variable DEON = 0 DEON = 1 
 
DEON = 0 DEON = 1 
SEX –0.58** –0.003††  –0.05**   0.01†† 
AGE –0.12** –0.18  –0.14** –0.18 
URBAN   0.056 –0.02    0.017   0.010 
CHILD   0.008   0.001  –0.011   0.002 
EDU   0.039   0.18    0.02   0.19 
INC   0.21**   0.50††  –0.09   0.15† 
REC   0.12**   0.08†    0.17**   0.10†† 
ENVIR   0.65**   0.34††    1.01**   0.68†† 
PRICE –0.28** –0.61††    0.10 –0.21†† 
* (**) Statistically different from zero at the 95% (99%) level of confidence.   
† (††) Statistically different from the DEON = 0 coefficient at the 95% (99%) level of confidence.  
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Figure 1: Categories of Ethical Attitudes. A simplistic categorization of ethical attitudes based 
on two dimensions. The vertical axis represents the first dimension, based on the question “How 
do we reason?” While consequentialists believe that only the consequences of an action matter, 
deonotologists feel moral principles must be taken into account.  The horizontal axis represents 
the second dimension that identifies, “Who or what has moral standing?” Humanists desire 
actions to be based solely on their beneficial results to humans, whereas naturalists feel the well 
being of nonhumans should be taken into account. In contrast to humanists, naturalists feel that 
parts of the natural world have intrinsic value independent of their benefits to human beings.   
Figure 2:  Utilitarian and Bounded Lexicographic Preferences for Environmental Quality. 
The left panel depicts the preferences of a utilitarian individual, who considers trade-offs 
between income and environmental quality. An increase in income allows this individual to 
consume at a higher level of utility.  Such an individual would be indifferent between points Z 
and Y, and both these points are always preferred to point X. This panel illustrates the typical set 
of preferences traditional microeconomics analysis would assume––individuals are willing to 
make trade-offs among market and nonmarket goods. The right panel depicts bounded 
lexicographic preferences. An individual with these preferences will trade off all income above 
M* for more environmental quality. Such an individual would be indifferent between X and Z but 
would prefer Y to either of these points. Above M*, individuals obtain infinite disutility if they 
do not achieve their environmental quality goal; trade-offs between M and q are not considered. 
The literature has shown that this behavior may occur when individuals have a “deontological’ 
ethical approach to consumption decisions, where an individual is solely concerned with his or 
her perception of right versus wrong (Glasser, 1999).  
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Figure 3: Engel Curves for Recreation under Bounded Lexicographic Preferences. The 
Engel curves for two individuals with bounded lexicographic preferences are labeled rd1() and 
rd2(), respectively. For income levels above the threshold Mi*, person i’s demand for recreation 
is perfectly inelastic with respect to income; the Engel curves are kinked at the threshold levels 
of income. Given the cross-sectional observations z1 and z2, the observed demand curve is 
represented by the dashed line, which not exhibit kinks and in general has a positive income 
elasticity.  
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